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# **THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW**

ISSUED BY THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 - 21 APRIL 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Laos: The crisis precipitated by Sunday's right-wing coup is far from over.

The coup was engineered largely by General Siho, who was jumping the gun on rightist contingency plans to step in should Souvanna withdraw as he had often threatened in the past. Souvanna was again doing so after the failure of the Plaine des Jarres talks.

General Phoumi, who ostensibly controls the coup generals, did not take a direct part and has indeed been unable to re-establish full control.

These generals, once the coup was accomplished, seemed to have had little idea of what to do next.

Their troops are apparently keeping Souvanna and perhaps Phoumi under some restraint.

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General Siho and Colonel Thonglith are violently anti-neutralist and anti-Communist officers with little appreciation of the international issues involved in their actions.

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As we go to press, Souvanna and his cabinet have gone to Luang Prabang to hand their resignations to the King, opening the way for a new government.

How this will all turn out is lost in a thicker than usual Laotian fog. One possibility is that Souvanna will be named to form a new government in which the Pathet Lao will not participate. We doubt that Souvanna, in so far as he is a free agent, will go along with this.

If it should fall out this way, the 1962 Geneva accords will be brought in serious question. Already Sihanouk has called for a new Geneva conference on Laos.

Kong Le, who at first adopted a hands off policy, is now strongly opposing the coup. There are no reports as yet of significant moves by the Pathet Lao. They are probably tempted, but wary of driving the rightists and neutralists closer together.

2. Cuba: Castro's speech on Sunday's anniversary of the Bay of Pigs contained his first strong attack on the Johnson administration, a marked departure from the careful, almost conciliatory line he has followed since the first of the year.

It may have been the starting gun for a new Cuban diplomatic and propaganda offensive against the US, but how Castro's threats will be translated into Cuban actions is conjectural.

Castro said he intended to deliver another note to the UN denouncing US "provocations and violations" of Cuba. He cited alleged provocations by US personnel at Guantanamo and made passing reference to violations of Cuban airspace.

The next day President Dorticos was somewhat more pointed on the last matter. Responding to a US warning against any interference, he said that Cuba is determined to defend itself with "appropriate action." He also said that the Guantanamo base issue would be taken before an appropriate body in the "more or less near future."

3. Brazil: Ambassador Gordon has been struck by the contrast between his first talk with President Castello Branco and his latest audiences with Goulart. He finds Branco "alert, attentive, intelligent and responsive" and settling into his new responsibilities in an "auspicious" way.

(Cont'd)

His administration has all but decided on a break with Cuba. The only matters still to be fixed are the timing and pretext.

The Brazilians are, however, concerned about the refusal of some Latin American nations, notably Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay, to extend full recognition.

They realize that Uruguay is a special case since Goulart is still there. They would like to encourage Montevideo to get Goulart to move on.

4. South Korea: Korea's volatile students were in the streets the past two days despite a blunt warning from the Pak government on Monday that the time had come for the students to get back to their books.

The numbers of students involved have not been as large as in last month's outbursts, but the government, which wants to get on with its negotiations with Japan, is clearly nettled.

The police have been getting tougher and Pak has been thinking of imposing martial law if the students remain obstreperous.

What makes the situation ticklish is the fact that the students are being egged on by opposition elements who want to bring down the government and by those whose main aim in life is to get rid of Kim Chong-pil. In short, all the ingredients are present for a nasty turn of events.

5. South Vietnam: Recent orders from the Viet Cong authorities to operatives in the field make it quite clear that the Communists wish to strike the Khanh regime hard before it gets its feet fully on the ground.

The orders call for an all-out effort in the countryside to hamper large-scale government operations, to harass government hamlets and set up Viet Cong "combat hamlets," and to build up Communist administration at the village level.

The effort in the cities is to be directed to promoting neutralization and offering help to coup plotters.

Viet Cong military action has indeed been stepped up in the countryside. Last week the Communists sustained a five-day battle with government forces, the largest single engagement of the war so far.

Since then they have thrown good-size attacks at government posts near the Cambodian border and in the delta southeast of Saigon. As a result, casualties on both sides last week were at near record levels.

6. Zanzibar: Foreign Minister Babu is in Indonesia. Rumors are about in East Africa that he will not be allowed to return and that his main followers will be sent abroad or shorn of power.

(Cont'd)

Animosity between Arabs and Africans is never far beneath the surface in Zanzibar and in fact was one of the principal forces behind the January revolution. In this situation, Babu and his henchmen are Arabs and pro-Peiping, while Vice President Hanga, who stands to be the chief beneficiary if Babu is neutralized, is an African and pro-Moscow.

In a pinch President Karume would probably throw in with fellow African Hanga. Bringing down Babu will not, however, be easy. He is the most able of the contending figures, and his followers are probably the best armed and disciplined.

The 200-man Tanganyikan police contingent could be a big factor in any showdown. It would probably support a Hanga-Karume grouping. Babu's men may have tried to get it off the island this weekend, but this was forestalled after Karume, at Hanga's urging, made a quick trip to Dar-es-Salaam.



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7. Syria: The Syrian Baath is still in very deep water.

Government security forces had more trouble than was bargained for in dealing with last week's disturbances in northern Syria. Now most of the bazaars in Damascus and other major cities have all but closed down to protest the government's socialization programs.

The more immediate threat comes from another direction, however.

an Egyptian-supported coup may be attempted



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8. USSR-Ghana: [redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] a Soviet major general is being named military 50X1  
attaché in Accra. The upgrading of this job [redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] could mean that the two countries are moving 50X1  
closer to a military aid agreement.

Adding to this possibility is the presence in  
Moscow since last Friday of the Ghanaian defense  
minister.

Nkrumah has long been interested in a Soviet arms  
deal and the Soviets have been willing, but the  
Ghanaian military have so far been dragging their feet.

9. USSR: [redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] 50X1


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10. USSR Space: [redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] This was the fifth Soviet space 50X1  
attempt in the past two months. Four of them have  
failed. [redacted] 50X1



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11. USSR

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12. Soviet Gold Sales:

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13. Reaction to the President's Speech: Soviet media have so far played President Johnson's New York speech factually. Editorial comment presumably will follow.

Headline emphasis was given the section dealing with the cutback in plutonium and enriched uranium. This portion of the speech was covered in detail and reported as an earnest of US desires for peace. The remainder of the speech was treated only briefly and without comment in the Tass summary.

Initial reaction in Western Europe are about as might be expected. The Gaullist press saw no significance to the nuclear cutback: "Its importance could not be underestimated."

The West Germans saw it as a step forward, but one whose significance "should not be overestimated."

Harold Wilson calls the agreement a welcome psychological step toward peace, even if it is not a positive ~~out~~ of disarmament.

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Reactions from Latin America, Asia and Africa are  
not yet available.

Peiping has not yet commented.

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
**Preliminary Analysis of Khrushchev's Statement on a Cut in the Production of Materials for Nuclear Weapons**

The two plutonium reactors on which Khrushchev says he is going to halt construction are probably the ones at Tomsk.

We had estimated that these reactors, which are dual purpose (electric power as well as plutonium production), would become operational in 1966 or 1967 with a capacity of about 1,500 megawatts each.

It is not clear from Khrushchev's statement whether the Soviets intend to stop construction on the reactors as plutonium producers or stop work altogether.

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